JUST DISCOVERED WHAT IS DERAILING TRAINS, CLOSING AIRPORTS && DESTROYING CRITICAL lNFRASTRUCTURE

SCADA systems (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) are responsible for air traffic controlling, remote train monitoring and control systems and provide almost all critical infrastructure with visibility/control of failure conditions in complex systems.


STUXNET is a malware software designed by 1srae1 and approved by the U.S. to attack SCADA systems.


[link to www.hstoday.us (secure)]

"SCADA systems are used to operate large-scale systems around the world, to include the U.S. The widespread adoption of SCADA grew because of the need to more economically manage large-scale industrial systems to support modern society’s growing demand for products, services, and utilities. The sheer size, complexity, and sensitivity of these large-scale industrial systems requires continuous monitoring, communication, and coordination at remote locations to provide needed utility services.

Prior to SCADA, industrial systems required numerous personnel to continuously monitor and coordinate activities, often by pre-digital analog devices. Personnel would monitor industrials systems and relay information to the main operator. As industrial complexity grew, sites became larger and as demand grew, sites often became more remote. In response, human-enabled analog systems become more cumbersome, time consuming, and uneconomical, and just in time digital technology grew and is pervasive today across industry.

One of the most foundational early tests to illustrate the risk of cyber-attacks on SCADA was conducted in 2007, when the Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) carried out the AURORA Project test in cooperation with the Idaho National Engineering Lab (INEL). AURORA’s purpose was to demonstrate how the growing reliance on SCADA systems was increasing U.S. critical infrastructure’s vulnerability to cyber-attacks, in this case a rotating diesel generator running on three-phase power. INEL engineers executed various cyber-attacks remotely through the internet and repeatedly turned it on and off putting it out of phase and within minutes caused the generator to implode from the generated stresses.


In 2010, a highly publicized cyber-attack on a SCADA system was uncovered. Malware was discovered on several systems across the globe, with an unusually high concentration of impacted systems in Iran. The malware was quickly named Stuxnet and was identified as a highly sophisticated and complex computer worm. Stuxnet garnered much attention from the international community as it became apparent that an unknown actor designed it to attack a particular SCADA brand and model; as such, Stuxnet still represents a key moment in the history of cyber-attacks on industrial systems. Stuxnet is worth discussing further.

Stuxnet was specifically engineered to attack a specific device and model within a particular industrial system. The apparent target was the PLCs associated with Iran’s Nantanz nuclear power facility’s centrifuges. Stuxnet compromised the integrity of the centrifuges by increasing their speed beyond their specification limits and making that unbeknownst to the operators, until the centrifuges were damaged. The attack allegedly destroyed upwards of 20 percent of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges and set back Iran’s nuclear program, which was believed to be the intent of the attack.

Undoubtedly, Stuxnet was well-planned, engineered, and took advantage of a multitude of vulnerabilities rarely seen in a singular attack. As such, Stuxnet was believed to be nation-state backed as it was so innovative, utilized insider knowledge, exploited human weaknesses, and exhibited a wealth of technical skills and expertise across a broad spectrum of industries. Stuxnet was even designed to self-replicate and jump from computer-to-computer and perform complex actions without any human provocation or a connection to the internet.

Additionally, Stuxnet took obfuscation into account. Stuxnet employed a layer of stealth on the PLCs it infected, and it utilized two legitimate security clearances under employed drivers. Stuxnet was even designed to limit its replication, to minimize its spread across SCADA systems to reduce its chances of discovery. Moreover, Stuxnet limited the number and the extent of damage to the centrifuges it was targeting so as not to draw direct and unwanted attention.

Mostly notably of all, Stuxent employed four separate and previously unknown exploits commonly referred to as “zero-day” vulnerabilities. These zero-day exploits were designed to act harmoniously in concert with one another. One zero-day exploit was used to gain access to the SCADA systems, another was used to spread the worm, and two additional zero-days exploits were used to elevate privileges within the system it infected. In addition, despite using four zero-day exploits, the architects behind Stuxnet even planned for when these zero-day exploits were patched and prepared for a secondary avenue to maintain and spread Stuxnet.

Without a doubt, the Stuxnet event marks a key turning point in cyber-related attacks. And, while the Stuxnet virus is well known for what it did accomplish, one of the most important takeaways from the event is not what Stuxnet did, but what it could have done.Certainly, had the architects of Stuxnet had other intentions, Stuxnet could have been far worse and far more malicious. Interestingly, the Stuxnet virus was comprehensibly decompiled and is available to download on the internet to analyze."